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# Peacebuilding Efforts in Somalia: Jubaland's Actors and Contribution to Success in Peacebuilding

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**Abstract:- This study sought to examine peacebuilding efforts in Somalia with a focus on Jubaland's actors and their contribution to the success of the region's peacebuilding efforts. The study employed primary and secondary data collection methods. Primary data was collected using key informant interviews while secondary data was collected from books, journal articles, reports, newspapers, bulletins as well as internet sources. Using the social contract approach., actors in the peace process in Jubaland sought to employ a bottom-up citizen-centric approach to conflict resolution in a region that has known chaos for the better part of the last three decades. The study found that the successful formation of Jubaland had barred any other option of stabilizing Somalia save for the 'building blocks' approach. Additionally, by incorporating key actors such as the Federal Government of Somalia, the Jubaland Administration and Ahlu-SunnaWal-Jama (ASWJ); local actors such as the Council of Islamic Scholars (CIS), Clans and Clan Elders, and the Business Community; and regional and international actors such as Ethiopia andKenya, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),, Jubaland's peace building efforts had all key players on board.**

***Keywords:-*** *Peacebuilding Efforts, Actors.*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Somalia is time and againdesignated as the world's most enduring and comprehensively failed state.Data from the United Nation's 2018 triennial review shows that Somalia has a gross national income (GNI) of $95 per capita against an average of $1,229 among least developed countries. Additionally, even though child mortality rates have fallen since from 171.1 deaths per one thousand live births at the turn of the millennium to 132.5 as of 2018, the rate is almost as twice high as the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 76 deaths per 1,000 live births, a phenomenon precipitated by the unavailability of social amenities due to the protracted conflict.[1] Furthermore, Somalia has been identified as a terrorist safe haven and has served as a key operational base for Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya including the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania, the 2002 Kikambala attack, the Kampala bombings in 2010, the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi in September 2013,the Garissa University attack in 2015 and the DusitD2 Hotel attack in 2019. Since the collapse of governance structures in the country, international exertions to peacebuilding in the Horn of African country have historically focused on the restoration of Central Government.

In the 1990s for instance, Hassan GuledAptidon, the then Djibouti president, convened the Djibouti I and II peace processes. These peace processes were propped up by Cairo, Rome and Riyadh and brought to the peace table representatives of various local movements such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somalia Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). However, withthe self-declared Republic of Somaliland and the General Mohammed Farah 'Aideed' led Hawiye HabrGidir wing boycotting these peace processes owing to their centralized approach to peace in Somalia, the Djibouti peace processes catastrophically failed.[2]

In October 1996, Ethiopia also hosted a peace process for Somalia at the resort town ofSodere process bringing together representatives of twenty-six Somali clan organizations. The six weeks Sodere peace talks culminated in the signing of a reconciliation agreement on the 3rd day of January, 1997. This agreement was also state-centric in that it established a National Salvation Council (NSC) which was tasked with forging preparations to create a Transitional Central Authority (TCA) or a Provisional National Government (PNG) of Somalia.[3]

Sodere was a watershed moment due to the fact that it instituted the first positive dialogue among the paramount Somali political players following the untimely withdrawal of the United Nations' peacekeeping forces in Somalia. Additionally,Soderebrought together virtually all the clan faction

[1]Least Developed Country Category: Somalia Profile. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Economic Analysis. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category-somalia.html
[2]Kasaija, Apuuli Phillip. 2010. "The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: Results and problems." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28 (3): 261-282
[3]Ibid

leaders in as well as touting the concepts of power sharing and inclusiveness. However, just like the Djibouti process, it failed due to its state centric approach to the Somali peace question as well as the exclusion of one of the most important players in Somalia politics at the time, the Hussein Mohammed 'Aideed' led Somali National Alliance which was absent during the conference.[4]

Another state-centric approach mooted to bring peace in Somalia was the 1999 Arta process which was convened by then Djibouti president, Omar Guelleh. The Arta process was the largest Somali peace process due to the fact that the process brought together over three thousand Somali traditional leaders, local organizations such as civil society organizations, intellectuals and Somali businessmen in a bid to establish a National Government. The Nairobi process is also key in that it led to the foundingof the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) using the '4.5 formula' according to which power was to be shared amongst the four main clan-families of Somalia: Hawiye, Darod, Digil-Rahanweyn and Dir; together with the minority clans, which constitute the 0.5.[5]

On the other hand, indigenous solutions to solve this protracted conflict that has relegated the Horn of Africa's nation into a black hole have been tried with some degree of success in some areas and utter failure in others. Most of these peace efforts were a mix of tradition and modernity succeeded in Somaliland and Puntland. The success registered in Somaliland and Puntland of forming regional governments 'building blocks' seemed to work for Somalia than lifting the collapsed Central Government. This example was taken to form Jubaland Regional State in which this case study was based on. Jubaland is a region bordering Kenya and Ethiopia. It is a region composed of Gedo, Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba administrative regions of Somalia.With this reality in view, this study thus sought to examine the JubalandFederal Member State(FMS) of Somalia, political success story.

Jubaland was formed when residents from Gedo, Lower and Middle Jubba regions came together, passed Jubaland constitution and hoisted the regional state flag on April 2013. The formation of Jubaland was inspired by successful formation of Somaliland and Puntland. The formation of Jubaland attracted intense opposition from the Federal Government of Somalia which heralded the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement which became the road map for creating acceptable Jubaland regional state of Somalia.[6] This culminated in the formation of the Jubaland Federal Member State following signing of the Addis Ababa agreement on 3rd May 2013 between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Leader of the Interim Juba Administration. The Addis Ababa Agreement was critical in the establishment of the Interim Juba Administration; the management of federal institutions and structures; the management of security forces and militia integration; and reconciliation and confidence building.

However, there was a challenge in implementing article two of the agreement on the management of federal institutions, which was part of a wider Constitutional revenue-sharing process.[7]Somalia's federalization and its success in bringing peace could be seen in its northern region where a form of localized, sub-national governance had taken shape in places like Puntland and Somaliland. In these regions, indigenous forms of state building initiated by sub-national groups resulted in the formation of *de facto* state structures which had made the northern regions havens of peace in a nation torn apart by chaos.[8] The success of regional governance and conflict resolution in the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland epitomized theefforts to return parts of Somalia to peace and to institutionalize mechanisms with which to bring peace and stability. Both shared geopolitical coherences and incoherence. However, the success of the Somaliland and Puntland regionalized conflict resolution initiatives was attributable to the fact that both had a dominant clan which made it easy to form a cohesive society, a phenomenon absent in Jubaland which had many clans. Additionally, the context under which the regionalization conflict resolution approach was being applied in Jubaland had been contested by the Federal Government of Somalia. Unlike Somaliland and Puntland who were formed in a 'failed state' context, Jubaland was being formed when the Fedaral Government of Somalia had the ability to claim to be the legitimate representative of the Sovereign State of Somalia.

In lieu of the foregoing, this research sought to bridge the gap in literature on Somalia while inferring the reasons for the relative progress in formation of Jubaland by reviewing the players and their contribution to the success of regionalism as the building block to peace in Somalia.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The lack of a stable Government in Somalia had contributed to the systemic conflict situation in the horn of Africa. Various authors had taken time to study the unique conflict dynamics in Somalia with some giving description of the underlying issues ailing Somalia, the best approach to resolving the conflict and offering suggestions on how to set up durable administrative units by forming regional states 'building blocks'. Brydenand Menkhaus argued that the 'building block' approach idea was first to break the territory down into smaller pieces that could be managed by a local authority, whereas these then later were to be re-unified under a decentralized, federal or even confederal

[4]Burgess, Stephen. 2013. "A Lost Cause Recouped: Peace Enforcement and State-Building in Somalia." *Contemporary Security Policy* 34 (2): 302-323

[5]Kasaija, Apuuli Phillip. 2010. "The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: Results and problems." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28 (3): 261-282

[6] The Agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubba delegation dated 27 August 2013, signed at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

[8] Redding, Matthew (10 September, 2013). *New Deal for Somalia*. The Centre for Security Governance. Retrieved from https://secgovcentre.org/2013/09/somalia-the-new-deal-and-non-state-security-actors/

structure.[9] This approach reached its zenith in the late 1990s when Puntland seemed to be moving in the same direction as Somaliland. Furthermore, the governance efforts of the Bay and Bakool regions by the Rahanwyn administration looked promising after succesful formation of Somaliland and Puntland regional States of Somalia.

In the mid-2000s, the revitalization of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a FederalGovernment partly re-ignited this decentralized approach to peacebuilding. Proponents of a decentralized type of governance pointed out that this is the only way to prevent dominant clan(s) monopolizing power in Somalia. However, proponents of a unitary approach were of the view that federalism would fragment Somalia further and further which would not only destroy all hope of a re-unified state, but also leave these smaller structures at the very mercy of next-door neighbour; Ethiopia, then deemed an antagonistic state. The position various Somali groups tend to adopt in this debate has been closely tied to how they perceive their clans' strength and options.[10]

Bryden and Menkhauswere of the view that the strength of the 'building block' approach to the Somali peace process was in the methodology's recognition that Somali's factions were gradually butunavoidably being overhauled by more responsible, stable and popular regionalized governance structures. These local governance structures were typically the products of protracted, broad-based consultative or 'electoral' process. As such, their authority and legitimacy emanated from the social contracts founding them which combines elements of modern constitutions and traditional 'xeer'. Moreover, their powers were circumscribed by the terms of the social contract founding them coupled by the need to maintain consensus. To Bryden and Menkhaus, the fact that these regionalized governance structures explicitly sourced their legitimacy from the consent of the governed as opposed to access to arms or external resources whichenhanced the prospects for the success of the 'building block' approach.[11]

According to Ken Menkhaus, towards the end of the second decade since the Somali conflict began, the international community was keen on a lasting solution especially in lieu of security threats emanating from Somalia including terrorism and maritime piracy. As such, it adopted the '4.5 formula'based upon which power was to be shared amongst the four main clan-families of Somalia, namely; the Dir, the Darood, the Hawiye, and the Digil-Rahanweyn; together with the minority clans, which constituted the 0.5. Proponents of the settlementcategorized it as a pivotal breakthrough and called for strong international support for implementation of the agreement. In mid-2008 their initial hope was that any agreement that facilitated the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces who had entered Somalia in a bid to oust the Islamic Courts Union would open the door for an end to the insurgency. They pointed to the fact that most of the war-weary Somali public wanted to see the agreement implemented as well.[12]

The focus on the Jubaland as one of the 'building blocks' was based on the fact that the Juba Valley hosted the headquarter of the extremist group, Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab operated from the region to launch attacks in Somalia and into the neighboring country, Kenya. Further, it had clans having the greatest competing interests. Additionally, Jubaland had attracted conflicting interests from the neighboring countries, notably Kenya and Ethiopia. Jubaland was regarded as among unruly Federal Member State(FMS) along Puntland and Somaliland by the Federal Government of Somalia. Moreover, even though Somalia performed dismally in all indices, the level of conflict differed according to regions with the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland enjoying relative peace and calm. The rest of South Central Somalia had differing levels of stability courtesy of intervention by AMISOM since 2007.

It was no wonder then, that forays had been made in suing track two diplomacy to pursue conflict management and resolution in Somalia. This was premised on the fact that Somalia was a unique case of state collapse. Track two diplomacy in Somalia had been possible through the intervention of non-state actors in Somalia. These included religious personalities and institutions, the civil society organizations, notable Somali personalities as well as the Somalis in the diaspora. Non-state actors such as the Puntland, Non-State Actors Association and the Somalia Southern and Central Non-State Actors had been critical in reaching out to marginalized groups in their specific region. This had been critical in fostering the reconciliation necessary to build trust and cooperation between the state and the society.[13]

Furthermore, civil society actors had forged mechanisms centered on representation as a fulcrum of peacebuilding and conciliation. As such, they had developed an outreach and dialogue programme in 2014 as a means to help parliamentarians to conduct outreach into regions. This resulted in a strengthened connection with their constituency as well as bridging the gap between the state and the society. Furthermore, these actors introduced reporting mechanisms for outreach. In Somaliland for instance, the civil society had conducted outreach trips to the Somaliland region in order to build consensus on key political milestones for the

[9]M. Bryden, (1991) New hope for Somalia: the building block approach. *Review of African Political Economy*, 26 (79), 134-140.

[10]M. Bradbury, (2008).*Becoming Somaliland.* Oxford: James Currey.

[11]M. Bryden, (1999). New hope for Somalia: the building block approach. *Review of African Political Economy*, 26(79), 134-140.

[12]Menkhaus, K. (2009). Somalia: 'They Created a Desert and Called it Peace(building)'. *Review of African Political Economy, 36*(120), 223-233

[13] Greene, A. L. (2011). *Re-thinking Somali national identity: Nationalism, state formation and peacebuilding in Somalia.* Kalmar, Sweden: Life & Peace Institute/Kroc Institute

Federal Government of Somalia. In the Southern region of Jubaland, a Juba reconciliation conference arrived at a consensus on the creation of a regional administration.[14]

According to Greene, the forays by the civil society had been centered on approaches that integrate the social structure of the Somali state forged along the traditional modes of identity i.e., the clan system and Islam as overriding religious order. As such, majority of Somalia's sustainable peace building efforts had tended to focus on the institutionalization of peacebuilding in Somalis socio-economic and political organizations in a manner geared towards ensuring the integration of the two defining identities of the Somali state i.e., clannism and the Islamic religion into working relationships geared towards peace through vertical integration measures at the local, regional and national levels. Furthermore, these peace building policies had been designed to contribute to the long term goal of a national Somali identity capable of horizontal integration to forge a common unity transcending clan and religion by bridging societal divisions.[15]

Recognizing that strategies that hold more promise for peacebuilders were power-sharing coupled by identity reconstruction, civil society organizations had been critical in ensuring the Somali Parliament had adopted a power sharing policy in its constitution by incorporating Somalia's 4.5 formula through the allotment of a parliament composed of a hundred and twenty-two parliamentary seats to four major clans. A further sixty two parliamentary seats had been bequeathed to a conglomeration of smaller clans.[16] Power sharing among clans in parliamentary decision making and resource distribution processes was necessary in the initial stages of state building and had been heralded as a harbinger to potential positive upshots. By incorporating the clan system through the use of Somalia's 4.5 formula in the allotment of parliamentary seats, there had been a significant potential in bringing legitimacy to the state structures of Somalia due to the fact that it dealt with the question of representation in a way familiar to most Somalis.[17]

These findings however had a number of shortcomings. First, they failed to map a holistic picture of political actors as well as the spoilers in Jubaland. In as much as the report identified Al Shabaab, the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu and the Jubaland administration, the report failed to identify the other actors who tended to be glossed over and excluded from conflict resolutions. This had been at the heart of the protracted nature of the Somalia conflict.Menkhaus argued that in Somali's South West along the Kenyan border, the strategic and material resources at stake in the Jubbaland as well as the ongoing maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia which was a subject of litigation at the International Court of Justice, made the area the scene of one of most complex and seemingly intractable conflict system in the former Somalia.[18]

Most focus hadbeen devotedto the struggle between different groups keen to control the lucrativeKismayoport and its revenue potential. However, the fertile farmlands along the banks of the Juba River Valley had also been subject to a multitude of claims and counterclaims based on successive waves of land acquisition by different groups from within and without the river'sriparian region. The fighting in the Southern valley for instance had not only involved the inhabitants of the area, but members of the Marehan clan from Northern Gedo region as well. This impliedthat a comprehensive agreement on power and resource sharing along the length of the valley was required before peace was finally restored and Jubalandtake its place alongside other 'building blocks' in a reconstituted Somali state.[19]

## III. METHODOLOGY

The study used both secondary and primary sources. Secondary data was derived from electronic and print books, scholarly electronic and print journal articles, magazines, bulletins and internet sources. Primary data was collected qualitatively using key informant interviews and focus group discussions with opinion leaders in Somalia. Furthermore, the researcher attended the Somali Reconciliation Conference organized by the Federal Government of Somalia and Interim Jubaland administration in Kismayu, Somalia from 16th September 2014 up to 5th October 2014. During the reconciliation conference deliberations, the researcher interviewed 15 opinion leaders from Federal Government of Somalia, Jubaland, Puntland and Somaliland as well as attending 11 inter-clan reconciliation deliberations. The sample was derived purposively, where five people were selected from each of the three regions. To prevent gender biasness, the research employed both male and female respondents in order to get inclusive data. The researcher used a voice recorder during one-on-one interviews and video recording to cover inter-clan reconciliation deliberations as they were mostly conducted in Somali language. The note book was sometimes used for the respondents who were not comfortable giving a voice recorded interview. The researcher hired the services of research assistants in the translation of interviews carried out in the Somali language

[14]Gateretse, J., &Buzanski, M. (2014). *Support to Building Inclusive Institutions of Parliament in Somalia.* New York: UNDP.

[15] Greene, A. L. (2011). *Re-thinking Somali national identity: Nationalism, state formation and peacebuilding in Somalia.* Kalmar, Sweden: Life & Peace Institute/Kroc Institute.

[16] Ibid

[17] Greene, A. L. (2011). *Re-thinking Somali national identity: Nationalism, state formation and peacebuilding in Somalia.* Kalmar, Sweden: Life & Peace Institute/Kroc Institute.

[18]K. Menkhaus, (2010). Diplomacy in failed state. Later national mediation in Somalia, Accord issue 21, 16-19).

[19]K. Menkhaus, (2010). Diplomacy in failed state. Later national mediation in Somalia, Accord issue 21, 16-19).

into English. The hired research assistants were Somali locals who were familiar with area, the people, culture and religion. The qualitative data collected was analyzed using content analysis where the patterns, themes and categories of analysis that came from the data were interpreted.

## IV. RESULTS

The study found out that in most peace processes, local Somali actors tended to encompass a limited ability to drive positive outcomes of these peace processes. On the contrary, these local actors tended to have ample capacity to exercise negative outcomes. Moreover, Somaliawas rich in potential spoilers fueled by the high levels of clan distrust, the ease with which clan alliances unravelled, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the extremely weak capacity of the Somalia Government to make defections and spoiler status costly. This power to shape or block peace initiatives is often derived from diverse sources, including one's position of respect in a given clan, financial resources at one's disposal, one's ability to shape public opinion, a position of power in Government, control over an armed militia, strong social networks, and perceived access to powerful international actors and their resources. Significant actors in Somalia are thus deemed to be those who possess some form of power or influence to mould political outcomes, mobilise communities, or to block developments they deem undesirable. These actors include local governance actors such as the Federal Government of Somalia,Jubaland Federal Member State Administration, the AlShabaab; socio-economic actors such as theCouncil of Islamic Scholars (CIS), Clans and Clan Elders, and the Business Community; and regional actors such as Ethiopia, Kenya, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), international NGOs and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

## V. DISCUSSION

The Federal Government of Somalia(FGS) was an active actor in Jubaland formation as the legitimate representative of the sovereign state of Somalia. Despite having not developed a systematic revenue system and relying on international aid, it had limited source of funds from the fees paid at the international port and airport in Mogadishu. It also lacked accountability systems for expenditures, and members of the Government and parliament were often accused of corruption and the misuse of foreign funds.[20] This made theFGS have a limited financial muscle to fund its operations including implementation of federalism.[21]

Since September 2012 when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud'sregime came into power, the formation of the JubalandFederal Member State had been the centre of post transitional Government crisis. On the one hand, the Federal Government in Mogadishu sought to assert its power over the process of regional state formation, while the leaders of theJubalandregion claimed otherwise. These contestations led to inter-governmental dialogues in Kismayowith none yielding any meaningful result[22]and on occasions resulting into armed clashes. Eventually, the Addis Ababa agreement was signed which specified the road map for creating an acceptable Jubaland Federal Member State (FMS).

The administration of Jubalandhad always been contested, with various actors contending for the region's control. Despite heightened opposition from the Federal Government in Mogadishu, the Somali 'technical committee', which encompassedresidents ofJubaland residents, voted in Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) as President of Jubaland in May 2013. This plebiscite was contested with Barre Aden Shire (Hiiraale) from theMarehan clan, also declaring himself President with overt support from the Federal Government in Mogadishu.[23]As an ex-Al Shabaab commander, Madobe led the RasKamboni brigade, an overly Ogaden militia with support from Kenya. In October 2012, RasKamboni and some elements of Somali National Army were critical in freeing Kismayo from the control of the Al Shabaab. The RasKamboni and the Somali National Army were later renamed Jubaland forces. With his election as the President of the three Juba regions being opposed by the Federal Government of Somalia, Barre Hiiraale, a formerwarlord supported by his old militia, the Juba Valley Alliance, which had controlled Kismayo from 1999-2006, was fronted by Mogadishu.[24] However, some sources indicated that Barre Hiiraale had taken the Kenyan trained and equipped Somali forces, 'Kamanga forces' from his Marehan clan. However, IGAD led negotiation saw Barre Hiraale surrender to Jubaland administration together with his forces.

Since the formation of the state of Jubaland, there have been clan and inter-regional tensions between Darood clans (particularly Marehan and Ogaden). For instance, in seeking to counter the dominance of the Ogaden, the Marehan backed Barre Hirale for the presidency of the region. Additionally, smaller clans in Jubaland had also staked their claims to the presidency. The Bimaal and Dir clans for instance fronted Omar Burale Ahmed while the Galja'alclans nominated Abdi BaaleeyHuseen as their presidential candidate. As such, the struggle for the control of Jubaland had manifested itself as a struggle between Hawiye clan supported by the national government in Mogadishu against the Darood clan who feel excluded from power. In lieu of these power struggles, Al-Shabaab used this opportunity to maintain a significant presence in

[20]L. McKay, (2011). Piracy off the coast of Somalia. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
[21]R. Faisal, (2007). *Local and global norms: challenges to Somalilands unilateral secession.*
[22]United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2012). Human Development Index (HDI) Somalia, p. 62.
[23]M. Bryden, (2013).*Somaliaredux? Assessing the new Somali Federal Government. A report of the CSIS Africa program.*Center for Strategic and International Studies.
[24] Ibid.

Jubaland[25] while maintaining their strategic headquarter in Jilibin Middle Juba from where they could coordinate cross border attacks, and key meetings with Al Qaeda and international facilitators.

Al-Shabaab was a common enemy for both the Federal Government of Somalia(FGS) and the JubalandFederal Member State(FMS). Al-Shabaab had waged war against the Federal Government of Somalia and JubalandFederal Member State (FMS) forcing the two players to be united in the common course of defeating Al-Shabaab.[26]The Al Shabaab could not be held to negotiate as they were international Islamic organization which did not accommodate ideologies like democracy. They also could not give up on their plans and all they wanted from the Somali situation was a win and nothing less. They had a very strong intelligence base on the government plans. But if the FGS could strengthen itself and make people secure then the people would shift loyalty to the Government. The Al Shabaab had mistreated the Somalis and hence lost the public confidence.[27]

Another hurdle was in the sectarian fissures in the region. Jubaland, unlike the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland, had been mired in endless conflicts between different social groupings largely hinged upon clan and religious lines. As such, both the Jubaland government as well as the Federal Parliament in Somalia faced a number of challenges and substantial systemic hurdles in peace building. Holding elections, erecting new institutions and choosing the best constitutional dispensation would not ineludibly result in conditions for peace and stability. The Siad Barre regime hangover was also noticeable in the variance between local ideas and values vis-a-vis a Westphalian vision of a state modelled on the conception of a Western democracy. As such, the institutions framed under this logic such as the Federal Parliament of Somalia were not viable in the eyes of the citizenry thus further deepening the divide between the state and the society.[28]

The second most important armed grouping in the Jubaland region was theAhlu-SunnaWal-Jama(ASWJ), which was opposed to Al-Shabaab and foughtthe terror groupings grip in the Central Somali region. ASWJ claimed to epitomize the traditional early Islamic order of the Sufis with an objective of confronting the Salafi and Wahhabi ideologies propagated by Al Shabaab, and more so in instances where armed groups try to enforce this upon civilians. It was considered an integral group in Somalia's political and security situation not only as a mediating force but also as a buffer. Prior to 2008, it was a peaceful order, founding schools and instituting social activities geared towards supporting the spread of their brand of Islam. However, when Al Shabaab provoked a reaction by desecrating graves and increasing restrictions on the regions under their control,ASWJ responded by driving AlShabaab out of their areas with Ethiopian-provided arms. Ethiopia appeared to exert a strong influence on ASWJ, supporting it as opponents of Al Shabaab by providing training and weapons. The Transitional Federal Government signed a power-sharing agreement with Ethiopia and ASWJ, securing formal position for ASWJ members in the cabinet in exchange for help fighting Al Shabaab. However, there were debates over whether this had actually happened.[29]

Another key actor was the Council of Islamic Scholars (CIS)which was a religious organisation thatbrought together representatives from a variety of Islamist organisations. It was based in Mogadishu and it had a moral authority over the city, with the capability to mobilise tens of thousands of followers. Its objective was to uphold Islamic values in Somalia, and was critical in voicing its opposition of the provisional constitution, which it deemed un-Islamic and called for consultation with scholars in the drafting process.[30]CIS had a pragmatic approach to the changing Somali context and had cooperated with many sectors of society, including warlords. It hadlargely rooted for a conciliatory approach among its members, a move that enabled it to exercise considerable influence at the Arta peace conference in 2000. Moreover, it had established dozens of schools and the University of Mogadishu, and rooted for strong social and cultural participation of its membership. It had also successfully operated some conflict resolution activities between warring clans. Members paid a fee, which partly-funded the organisation, while the rest came from charitable donations and grants.[31]

Social relations in the Somali society were based on a system of customary contract referred to as *xeer*, which is adjudicated by ad-hoc committees of elders. The fundamental contracting unit was the mag-paying group, the members of which acted as guarantors of the good behaviour of fellow members, and on pain of having to share the burden of compensation on any member's behalf should they be adjudged the guilty party in a dispute. Each mag-paying group was represented by one or more informal leaders or 'aaqil; a term which was sometimes translated as 'chief', but which was primarily an influencing, negotiating and chairing role, rather than one which granted the incumbent authoritative power. During the time of the Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian colony and trusteeship, both colonial administrations attempted to co-opt the role by paying a stipend to 'aaqils or their equivalent in return for work on behalf of the colonial administration. A similar practice had earlier been employed on a more limited basis by Egyptian administrators, and quite likely

[25]Samuels, K. (2020). An opportunity for peacebuilding dialogue? Somalia's constitution-making process. *Accord* (21).
[26]Oral interview, Hidig, SFGM.P 05/09/2014.
[27]Oral interview, Hidig, SFGM.P 05/09/2014.
[28]Samuels, K. (2020). An opportunity for peacebuilding dialogue? Somalia's constitution-making process. Accord (21).
[29]K. Menkhaus, (2011). *Somalia and the Horn of Africa.* World Development Report 2011 Background Case Study.
[30]Saferworld. (2012). Mogadishu rising? Conflict and governance dynamics in the Somali capital. Saferworld.
[31] Ibid.

before that it was also continued and adapted by subsequent Somali Governments.[32]

Somali customary law was hinged upon sets of principles. However, it was not rigid and appreciated the fact that too great a level of specificity in law would fail to avail the flexibility essentialin dealing with the vagaries of day-to-day life. As such, these sets of principles hadmutated over time oscillating around the dual focus of protection of the rights of the individual to life, liberty and property as well as the individual's commitment to family and clan. In the context, the related processes of adjudication, mediation, negotiation and consensus-building carried out with a pledge to transparency and in good faith as critical in the application of recognised principles. Rhetoric and oratory were prized skills, since the aptitude to coax others of the veracity of an argument would contribute directly to the achievement of a more advantageous agreement.

There was a strong nexus between business and politics in Somalia. Politicians were frequently businesspeople and vice versa. Additionally, lucrative government contracts were routinely awarded to business friends. As such, the business community wielded considerable sway on the socio-political and economic nature of the state of Somalia.[33] One of the largest businessesin Somalia was the telecommunication sector which was necessary in facilitating one of the most important sources of finances for the Somali state i.e., remittances. The telecommunications revolution in Somaliaheralded the rise of remittance companies for diaspora members to send money to family members back at home. While these cash funds were then used for a variety of purposes, they were often invested in socio-economic development, particularly in water, electricity, health, education and in real estate construction.[34]

In this regard, the business community was pivotal in moving money around the country through its financial and resource networks. To achieve this, the business community built alliances across different clans in order to secure the movement of goods. Business entrepreneurship in Somalia thus owed its success to the telecommunications and money transfer boom. Additionally, owing to this entrepreneurial and strategic asset acumen, the Somali business community was highly valued and controlled much of Somalia's asset base.[35] In Jubaland, the Jubaland business community financed the delegates' conference which led to the formation of Jubaland regional state of Somalia.[36]

Regional actors such as Ethiopia, Somalia western neighbour remained a central military and political player in 21st century Somalia.[37]In the late 2000s and 2010s, Ethiopia had mooted incursion and intervention forays in Somalia largely aimed at installing or bolstering 'friendly' national or local administrations opposed both to political Islam as well as in support of separatist movements across the border. As such, Ethiopia was deeply unpopular among Somalis and a range of organisations linked to it, including AMISOM and the Federal Government of Somalia(FGS), had also become somewhat unpopular by association.[38] According to the Crisis Group (2020), while Ethiopia was a troop contributor to the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Somalia, it supported the Federal Government in its stand-off with Federal Member States(FMSs) particularly in Jubalanda situation which played into the hands of the Al-Shabaab Islamist insurgency which had used this opportunity to further entrench its presence.[39]

In the first two decades of the Somali conflict, Kenyan involvement in Somalia had been historically diplomatic and political in nature. In the 2000s, Nairobi played a critical role in several rounds of regional mediation and Government-formation efforts geared towards peacebuilding in Somalia. For instance, Kenya hosted the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) until 2007, along with most Western embassies, UN agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO) offices assigned to Somalia – many of which still remain in Nairobi today. In October 2011, the unilateral Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) intervention dramatically altered this approach and Kenya became a major military as well as political player in the Southern Somali state of Jubaland.

Although Nairobi had long seen the combination of insecurity and political Islam in Southern Somalia as a threat to Kenya's stability, the Kenyan intervention was mooted in response to a range of attacks and kidnappings of Western tourists in the North Eastern and coastal parts of Kenya believed to be orchestrated by the Al Shabaab. Scholars allegedthat the Kenyan Governmenthad mooted plans since at least 2008 in an attempt to establish a friendly 'buffer state' in Jubaland to address theexistential threat of terrorism and political Islam. Other scholars argued that the Kenyan military was ordered into Somalia as a means to facilitating the return of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees who had fled to Kenya for the last two decades.[40]

[32]I. M. Lewis, (2002). A modern history of the Somali. Oxford: James Currey.
[33]Saferworld. (2012). Mogadishu rising? Conflict and governance dynamics in the Somali capital. Saferworld.
[34]K. Menkhaus, (2011). Somalia and the Horn of Africa. World Development Report 2011 Background Case Study.
[35]Saferworld. (2012). Mogadishu rising? Conflict and governance dynamics in the Somali capital. Saferworld.
[36] Oral interview, AbdirizakShiekh Omar, member of Somali technical committee for creation of Jubbaland, 20 September 2014.

[37]L. Hammond, (2013). Somalia rising: things are starting to change for the world's longest failed state. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 7(1), 183-193.
[38] Ibid.
[39]International Crisis Group (14 July, 2020). Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b158-ending-dangerous-standoff-southern-somalia
[40]C. McEvoy, (2013). Shifting priorities: Kenya's changing approach to peacebuilding and peacemaking. Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.

Some analysts had criticised the real politik nature of Kenya's immersion in Somalia since 2011, although some positive developments had been achieved in Jubaland in implementation of Federalism and bringing the rule of law which would have a spill over effect to security in Kenya.[41]

Interventions in a conflict as a means to the management and resolution of the conflict in question was largely pinned upon regional state actors as well as continental and regional organizations. Continental and Regional integration schemes were pivotal in heralding peace to their members.[42] In their exploration of the role that regional integration schemes played in the prevention, management and resolution of international conflicts, Welch and Nye (2010) were of the view that military interventions were necessary in instances where the military of the state in question and the citizenry were involved. Additionally, military interventions were necessary in instances where weapons of war were adversely used by actors to a conflict with the intent to kill or wound and commit war crimes.[43]

To this end therefore, military interventions in conflicts by outside parties was largely conjured as a means to ensuring a cessation of hostilities as well as contribute toward the lessening or resolving the conflict in question. Here, intervening parties keen on managing and resolving the conflict in question militarily, were presumed to be intervening impartially and with disinterest. Additionally, their entrance into the conflict in question should create an enabling environment for other processes of conflict resolution and the cessation of hostilities. This was critical in determining the flow of bargaining interaction and ultimately influence the direction and shape of outcome. When a regional integration scheme was intervening military as a third party, it should invariably be guided by its own values, interests and objectives in the settlement of a conflict and a notion of the outcome it envisaged.[44]

In the Somali case, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was dispatched in March 2007 and was tasked with protecting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu and its institutions. AMISOM comprised of troops drawn from AU member states such as Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia.[45]AMISOM had been wholly dependent on Western funding and logistical support to carry out its mandate, with the US, EU, UK and France being key contributors.[46]The AMISOM had been critical to defeating and driving Al-Shabaab from the areas it had established control and establish the Somali Government hold onto political authority. Scholars were not in unison on the level of local support for the operation. Some were of the view that it was perceived as an unwelcome and occasionally brutal Western 'Trojan horse'. On the other hand, others were of the view that many Somalis were grateful to AMISOM for alleviating the protracted conflict in parts of the country. Most agreed that AMISOM enjoyed greater local support in the latter years largely due to the improved security situation in Somalia. However, the lack of a clear 'exit strategy' remained a concern for many Somalis.[47]

Most Western International NGOs (INGOs) had been forced to withdraw or scale down their operations from South Central Somalia for logistical, legal and security reasons. As such, the number of INGOs in the Jubaland region hadsignificantly reduced from around 40 to 15 between 1995-2010. CARE for instance left South Central Somalia in 2008 for security reasons. In 2010, the World Food Programme (WFP) left for similar reasons followed by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Save the Children in 2012 and the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in 2013. Majority of these organisations, Anderson avers, had been increasingly forced to operate from Nairobi as well as to rely on local NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid through 'remote management' practices. While the effect of these withdrawals on the Somali population had been varied, WFP's departure in 2010 was particularly devastating during the 2011 famine and its aftermath.[48]

This flight of Western INGOshad largely been due to their targeting by Al Shabaab who branded them representatives of 'imperial' American and Ethiopian interests, a subjective tag further exacerbated by the prominence of American and other Western flags on many humanitarian aid parcels as well efforts by officials of the United Nations to incorporate INGO support into political processes in Mogadishu. While most INGOs managed to come to de facto arrangements with the Al Shabaab, thus allowing them to operate and provide some aid in Shabaab-held areas, this was frustrated since 2010 owing to legal

[41]A. Meleagrou-Hitchens, S. Maher, & J. Sheehan, (2012). Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab's Western Media Strategy. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR).

[42]Sandole, D. J., & Van De Merwe, H. (1993). *Conflict resolution theory and practices integration and application.* Manchester: Manchester University Press

[43] Welch, D. A. (2010). *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History.* Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson

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[46]M. Bryden, (1999) New hope for Somalia: the building block approach. Review of African Political Economy, 26(79), 134-140.

[47]Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., Maher, S., & Sheehan, J. (2012). Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab's Western Media Strategy. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR).

[48]D. Anderson, (2012). Kenya's Somalia invasion: Local indications, regional implications. Presentation by Professor David Anderson, University of Oxford at the University of Birmingham.

restrictions that the American government placed upon the transfer of resources to and through terrorist organisations in Somalia. As such, this partly explained why the World Food Program pulled out of Somalia citing its inability to meet donor obligations on top of its security concerns.[49]

To fill the void, a number of INGOs from Islamic states had become graduallycritical actors as facilitators and providers of humanitarian aid. Owing to their lack of an imperial tag, these organisations hadunrelentingly operated in much of SouthCentral Somalia even as their Western counterparts had been forced to withdraw. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for instance had become an increasingly critical provider of humanitarian assistance to Somalia since the outbreak of famine in 2011 and was viewed by Somalis as a more culturally sensitive and sincere donor as opposed to most Western states and organisations of yesteryears.[50]

Originally a forum for dealing with issues related to drought and development across the Horn of Africa region, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established by Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda in 1986. Morphing into a security-political organization in the 1990s, the IGAD had played a critical role in the Somali peace process since the early 2000s. In October 2002 for instance, IGADinitiated the Eldoret-Mbagathi Peace Process. This process heralded the development and adoption of the Federal Charter which led to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government. Since then, IGAD had maintained a strong focus on Somalia through the IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation. This office was mooted with a view to follow up on the implementation of the Eldoret-Mbagathi Process. The office had dedicated itself to mobilize resources for the Federal Government of Somalia and had sought to play a coordinating role.[51]

In 2012, theIGAD developed a Grand Stabilization Plan for South-Central Somalia. One of the pivotal tasks of the plan was the founding of a local administration in Somalia. An informant (D 17.01.2013) connected to IGAD described Kenya and Ethiopia as dominating actors within IGAD with the potential of driving IGAD initiatives in the directions of their own national interests. This informant explained that after Kenya and Ethiopia entered Somalia with military forces in the region of Jubaland, they needed an umbrella under which they could operate. In this regard, the two countries adopted the IGAD Stabilization Plan, and developed a 'Jubaland initiative' under it. To the informant, the Jubaland initiative was technically led by IGAD, but practically led by Kenya and Ethiopia". Kenya and Ethiopia also took central positions in the forming of the Joint Committee which would drive the IGAD Stabilization Plan. The informant also mentioned several problems in this process. First, the committee was chaired by Kenyans and Ethiopians – and not by Somalis; second there were no other IGAD countries present; third the committee was dominated by representatives of Somali origins – who could be suspected to have clan interests; and forth on the Kenyan side the work was led by people from security agencies.[52] The IGAD Chair of the council of foreign ministers facilitated the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia(FGS) and the Jubalanddelegation.[53] The IGAD had facilitated the implementation of the articles contained in the Addis Ababa agreement.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Jubaland peace building efforts had onboard all key players. To begin with, as the most central actor in Somalia and upon which the hopes of a future peaceful Somalia are pegged on, the Federal Government of Somalia, was the legitimate representative of the Sovereign state of Somalia. On the other hand, the Jubaland Federal Member State (FMS) was the actor responsible for reconciliation and making all-inclusive government to ensure peace and security. Al Shabaab was another critical player who continued to fight both the Federal Government of Somalia and the Jubaland Federal Member State. If Al Shabaab dropped the call for war, the security challenge in Somalia would have been solved. It was also to be seen that when the Federal Government of Somalia disputed the formation of Jubaland FMS, the IGAD chair (Ethiopia) facilitated the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement which specified the road map for forming an acceptable Jubaland Federal Member State(FMS). Jubaland creation was an example of bottom up approach in line with the social contract theory. However, the creation of Jubaland was faced with the challenge of religious and clan inclinations which made governance and loyalty difficult to attain. There was also the challenge of integrating the various armed militia groups The inclusion of women in the peace process in Jubaland was rare act considering the Somali community was chronically male dominated.

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