The Philosophical Implications of Understanding the Dual and Multiple Discourses of Realization

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Abstract:- Understanding realization is the most series enquiry that involves having deeper insights among differing fields of the studies. Because everything that exist has a relation, and within such a relation there is realization. This implies that there are at least two distinct realities in realization. These are: (a) the subject realizer and (b) the object realized. However, one can encounter a dilemma while he/she attempts to grasp the full connotation/intension of realization. The first one is that the dilemma (problem) of whether or not the subject (realizer) is related to the object (realized) or vice versa. And the second problem is linked to identifying the process of realization (that is, 'realizing') since it locates itself as a medium between realizer and realized within the relation of ... This is completely philosophical discourses related to: what is reality in realization? Is reality one or many in realization? What is/are the relationships between realities in realization? How to know those realities and the forces/principles that connects those realities (or the whole with the pats)? Such questions really involve an investigation of epistemological and metaphysical spheres of subject-object dichotomy. At the end, epistemology of metaphysics becomes the main curios sphere in which phenomenological-realism will be uncovered while searching the logic behind such process.

Keywords:- Realization, the I, the Other (I), phenomena, coherentism, the Absolute, the pats (body).

I. INTRODUCTION

Realization is an ambiguous concept (noun) which can be seen differently within various contexts. According to Hurley's claim "a linguistic expression is said to be **ambiguous** whenever a word (structure of statement) has one or more clear distinct meanings in a given context" [1].[1] Though realization appears as simple while calling its name, its connotation has a complex meaning within philosophical discourse due to its ambiguity. Furthermore, this complexity of understanding realization within philosophical context arises from three important possibilities. These are:

- First, 'philosophy' is not defined or understood in a simple way since it is the search for (knowing) truth and the logic (general principles) of governing realities or those realities themselves [2].[2] However, in this context I am not claiming to know the "realities in themselves" since no one is certain of having clear and full knowledge of any reality. Rather they (our knowledge) are simply an approximation of reality.
- Second, the philosophical investigations of realization involves the subject-object dichotomous discourse of epistemic-metaphysical journey which involves finding its proper sphere among the sub-branches of philosophy (that is, it is issue of how to know what is to be known);
- Third, realization is also a process. As a holistic investigation it involves identifications of: what is realizer (the subject), realized (the object) and realizing (its process).

Due to these possibilities the philosophical enquiry of the concept 'realization' involves careful investigation and analysis of various philosophical arguments within there. However, in this context it is seen through the claim of Aristotelian actualization (actuality) in which dualism, holism, and phenomenology become the key concerns of the topic [3].[3] The reason is that Aristotle was the first person who finds the nature of relation or category and for him "everything that exists has a category or relation" [4].[4] Therefore, to enrich this investigation the works (articles) such as: "Realization" (Wilson and Cravel 2006), and "Understanding the Dimensions of Realization" (Polger and Shapiro 2007) become highly useful on depicting the nature of realities and how such realities are fully known through different perspectives.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE DUAL AND MULTIPLE DISCOURSES OF REALIZATION

2.1. Realization as the Subject of Dual Discourse: Wilson and Cravel

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[1] Specifically (see P.Hurley and L. Watson 2018, p.165). The logical ambiguity and vagueness of language are clearly available on P.H. Hurley and L. Watson, *A Concise Introduction to Logic*. Thirteenth edition, (U.S.A: Cengage Learning, 2018, PP.85, 165, and 174).

[2] On difficulty of defining philosophy (see A. Rosenberg, 2000, p.1) of his book which is named *Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction*. Second edition, (London and New York, Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2005).

[3] Z. Bechler 1995, pp. 112 - 113.

[4] P. Blum 2017, p. 1.

According to Wilson and Cravel's article "Realization" the concept of 'realization' becomes an open subject which can be investigated between philosophy and psychology through "the four 'isms': physicalism, functionalism, computationalism, and reductionism" [5].[5]

Wilson and Cravel put the first three 'isms' (that is, physicalism, functionalism, and computationalism) under the scope of philosophy whereas they put reductionism under the scope psychology.[6] They further defended such dual unity of philosophy and psychology by calling realization as "the servant of the two masters" which can be investigated between "metaphysicians of mind and cognitive scientists." [7]

The union or intersection of philosophy and psychology on realization is seen through analysis of what is realizer (the subject), what is realized (the object), and how realizing (its process) works. Indirectly, it involves serious assessment of the relationship between the whole and pats within the light of those "four 'isms'". While we see realization within its holistic dimension, then its scope become philosophy (that is, through physicalism, functionalism and computationalism).[8]

The way in which the three positions view how realization works are interrelated. In physicalism the mental states are depended on physical/brain states in which realization is seen through the ontological existence of mental states to its laws. This does not mean that physicalism defended the existence of mind as the subject. Rather it looks mental states as the same with brain states without defending reductionism. The reason is that in mental philosophy physicalism accepts the ontological existence of matter without reducing matter into the mind [6].[9] On the other hand, functionalism deals with the "functions and causal roles" in which the physical is realizing the mental rather than strictly identical to it.[10] Lastly, computationalism explains the nature of mental states through the analogy between human brain with that of computer/artificial intelligence. As computer has many programs in which different software installed on same/single hardware, then mental states are connected to brain (like Hilary Putnam's "the Turing Machine" of artificial intelligence).[11]

Unlike metaphysics of mind which sees realization through holistic subject; the term 'realization' is seen "in implicit and decompositional" (via its object/realized)

within the scope of cognitive science.[12] It follows that, reductionism will takes place within psychology while an enquiry of realization can be investigated in mechanistic interpretations.

As 'realization' is needed to eliminate a 'mind-body problem' of dualism[13], then the task of philosophy is "explaining the notion of brain-states to its per-se" [which is the subject /the whole rather than its pats].[14] In contrary, psychology concerns to the activities/functions/mechanisms on which how the pats (the objects) are connected to the whole (to the subject). This shows that Wilson and Cravel weigh physicalism-functionalism as more convincing position than the others positions.[15] Consequently, philosophy of psychology is the genuine sphere in which an enquiry of realization will be carried out.

2.1.1. The Problem of the "Other" as an Objection Against the Dual Discourse of Realization

The implication of defending the dual unity of mental philosophy and psychology has tremendous impact on the position of existentialism. Because, in existentialism the 'I' is only a concrete living individual/body.[16] Unlike such claim of existentialism the existence of many selves (plural 'I') or peoples makes the former subject 'I' into an object 'I' rather than the subject itself.[17] Ted Honderich further shows the existence of the many selves (other peoples) by using philosophical language which is called "the *Other*". It is from such claim in which the "problem of the other minds") involves further investigations (Ibid.). But in existentialism the direction of movement (of investigation) is from "I think, therefore, I am" to "I think, therefore, I exist" of Descartes to Kierkegaard with their respective manners.

Therefore, the philosophical enquiry of holistic realization (the subject alone) involves further investigation and can leads to the existence of an 'Absolute I' which is metaphysical speculation rather than intuitive introspection. This problem arises from the unity/intersecting point of the whole and the pats, and enforced us to find another discourse on realization rather than only looking through duality of mental philosophy and psychology.

2.2. Realization as the Subject of Multi-discourse: Polger and Shapiro

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[5] Wilson and Cravel 2006, pp. 2 – 3.
[6] Wilson and Cravel 2006, pp. 4 & 7.
[7] Ibid. pp. 2 - 3.
[8] Wilson and Cravel 2006, pp. 7 – 8.
[9] The mental philosophical views of Physicalism in this context is (quoted in Ted Honderich 2005, p. 716).   T. Honderich (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Second edition, edited by Ted Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
[10] Wilson and Cravel 2006, p. 8.
[11] Ibid. p. 9.

[12] Ibid. p. 8.
[13] Wilson and Cravel 2006, p. 6.
[14] Wilson and Cravel 2006, p. 23.
[15] Ibid. p.16.
[16] (see Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Nietzsche (cited from Honderich 2005, p. 277)).
[17] Ted Honderich shows the existence of the many selves (other peoples) by using philosophical language which is called "the *Other*" (Honderich 2005, p. 673). It is from such claim in which the "problem of the other minds" involves further investigations (Ibid.). But in existentialism the direction of movement (of investigation) is from "I think, therefore, I am" to "I think, therefore, I exist" of Descartes to Kierkegaard with their respective manners.

The other literary work that examines the ambiguous character of realization in philosophical sphere is that of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro. In the article "Understanding the Dimensions of Realization" (2007) Polger and Shapiro analyzed the comparative enquiry between Carl Gillett's "dimensioned view of realization" with the "flat view of realization" [7].[18]

Both Polger and Shapiro attacked the dimensioned view of realization since it defined realization as "the relation between property instances."[19] That means it sees realization through its composition/pats/objects rather than the subject. Contrary to such Gillett's account of dimensioned realization the flat view realization looks realization as "the relationship between property rather than property instances."[20]

After borrowing Jaegwon Kim's example of "*pain and its cause in the brain*" Polger and Shapiro attacked the dimensioned view of realization by saying:

"If nothing that is realized were multiply realized, then it would be unclear why realization and multiple realizations should be associated" and "it leads to contradiction in its non-realized character of property instances."[21]

Polger and Shapiro further defended flat view realization by providing two important premises as follows:
a) Realization is seen in terms of "intra-level relation-namely, relation of occupying or playing functional roles" like Aristotle's 'hylomorphism' or the union of form-matter.[22]
b) While looking realization through ontological categories (that is, realizers as property or property instance), then "the property of having some other property is a 'second-order' or 'functional' property."[23]
c) Realized and realizer's properties are inseparable since both of them "must be instantiated in the same individual." An illustration of this position is further explained by Jaegwon Kim's realization in which Kim fully explained the analogy of how *pain and its cause in the brain* are inseparable.[24]

III.   PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS BEHIND THE DUAL AND MULTIPLE DISCOURSES OF REALIZATION

In the process of examining the two discourses (i.e. dual and multiple discourses) on realization one can possible to draw the general discourse of epistemic-metaphysical (subject-object) intersection of philosophical gap. It looks like this: while understanding realization there is a self-controversy on whether the subject moves itself to the object

or the object is related to the subject. Consequently, all of the objects (non-I) become 'relata' to the subject, and as such the 'intensionality' character of consciousness in phenomenology is dashed into the ground within this context [8].[25]

To make it clear I wish to provide an illustration of 'myself' hereafter. When I start to think about 'myself'/'I' in relation to the four directions, then all of those four directions surrounded to me/I. In this case the 'I' acted as a realizer, and those directions (including the objects within there/them) become realized (relata) to me ('I'/ 'myself'/ my mind)[26]. In this case Jean-Paul Sartre clearly distinguished the nature of ego: the 'I' from the 'Me' to show the exact distinction between the 'mind' from the 'body' with their respective manners. Sartre called the former ego as "transcendental ego" whereas the latter ego as "psychological ego" (see Sartre's "Constituents of the ego" in which Sartre defended "the Me"/'body'/ 'psychological ego' rather than the "I").[27]

In contrary, I defended Sartre's "transcendental ego" or the 'I' in which I defined mind as the collections of ideas in one place. One/single idea is the part/pats of mind. On the other way, such view is used by Rene Descartes for the first time by using/employing the "method of doubt" [9].[28] I use it [this 'method of doubt'] in order to identify whether or not it is 'I' which is related to those directions or vice versa. Without any doubt those directions (including the objects within them) are connected to themselves and to the 'I' by the means of 'wires-of-consciousness'. Thus, both subject and object (realizer and realized) are connected together through coherentism approach to the nature/structure of truth.

According to coherentism truths are like the web of spider and all of them cohere/conjoined together rather than

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[18] T. W. Polger and L. A. Shapiro, 2007, p.1.

[19] Polger and Shapiro 2007, pp. 1- 2.

[20] Ibid. P. 7.

[21] Ibid. P. 3.

[22] Polger and Shapiro 2007, p. 7.

[23] Ibid. p. 7.

[24] Ibid. P.4.

[25] J.P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (cited from "Class Lecture Notes" of Professor Spade (1995), *Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*. Copyright at Paul Vincent Spade, 1996, p. 46.

[26] In this case Jean-Paul Sartre clearly distinguished the nature of ego: the 'I' from the 'Me' to show the exact distinction between the 'mind' from the 'body' with their respective manners. Sartre called the former ego as "transcendental ego" whereas the latter ego as "psychological ego" (see Jean-Paul Sartre's "Constituents of the ego" in which Sartre defended "the Me"/'body'/ 'psychological ego' rather than the "I" (Sartre 1995, cf. Spade 1996, pp. 96 – 98). In contrary, I defended Sartre's "transcendental ego" or the 'I' in which I defined mind as the collections of ideas in one place. One/single idea is the part/pats of mind.

[27] Sartre 1995, (cf. Spade 1996, pp. 96 – 98).

[28] (see Descartes' "Method of Doubt" (or *First Meditation: On What Can be Called into Doubt*)) (cf. Miller and Jensen 2009, p. 87)).

standing alone or corresponding to the external world [10].[29] As Bonjour said that:

"… central claim of coherentism is that the sole basis of epistemic justification is relations among beliefs, rather than between beliefs and something external." [30]

This implies that it is impossible to separate the subject from the object, and difficult to cite/show its starting point at this or that.

However, as mathematical laws put point the center of circle; and the circle/line is made up of points, then the same applies on the relations between realizer and realized. Hence, all of the relata (including my brain) put me ['I'] the center of realized, and therefore, 'I' or my mind is strictly unique or distinct from my brain though both of them are inseparable. This is what metaphysicians of mind called the metaphysics of mind. Therefore, it is possible to define mind as simply the collection/union of ideas in one place (while we see Rene Descartes' "clear and distinct" in which Descartes claimed the criteria to demarcate knowledge from opinion, and tried to explain the ontological existence of mind in his *Second Meditation*) [11].[31]

From the ontological existence of mind it is possible to criticize the claims of subjectivity on the nature of truth/reality. Particularly the positions of existentialism (Kierkegaard's subjectivism [12],[32] and George Berkeley's subjective idealism or solipsism become no more surprising arguments against objective idealisms of Hegelian "Geist"/ "Absolute" and Plato's objective idealism/"Forms" (absolutism). [33] Miller clearly shows how Berkeley's subjective idealism/solipsism eliminates the mind-body problem through "Esse est Percipi"/ "To be is to be perceived". [34]

By citing Sartre's dictum of "existence precedes essence" and "subjectivity must be the starting point" [35] Miller, further, shows how existentialism becomes the giant opponent of absolutism. [36] The reason is that while I am standing to think about the relationship between 'realizer', 'realized', and its process 'realizing', then there is a certain possibility when the subject becomes an object [13].[37]

3.1. Can the Subject ('I') Become an Object (O)?
I doubt whether or not the realizer subject can changed into an object while looking the existence of the other selves (plural I's) since there are also peoples like me in which I become an object to them. [38] Therefore, 'I'/'myself'/'my mind' in turn become an object to the peoples around me [to their mind] since the subject-subject/mind-mind ['realizer-realizer'] relationships can leads to "the problem of the other mind".[39] This is an exception of telepathy or reading mind (which is an aspect of extra sensory perception) in which the knowledge of the other mind is completely impossible and outside the realm/process of realization.

Without any doubt Einstenian relativity theory (point of reference) proves the existence of many selves (plural 'I'), and therefore, it is not through intensionality of phenomenology in which those selves (plural I's) are connected together [14]. [40] Rather they are connected together by the means of coherence like the joint of points (mathematical points that create a line or circle).

Such view become against the popular view of Husserl's elaboration on the nature of 'I', the "other I," and the failure of dualism/Cartesian "Ship-wreck" on explaining how to solve the union or relationship between mind and matter if realities are really two distinct things. To solve

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[29] L. Bonjour 2009, p. 187.

[30] L. Bonjour 2009, Part II/Chapter 9, p. 189.

[31] For detail see Rene Descartes' "clear and distinct" in which Descartes claimed the criteria to demarcate knowledge from opinion (cf. Miller and Jensen 2009, p. 90), and tried to explain the ontological existence of mind (*Second Meditation*).

[32] S. Kierkegaard (no date), *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Section II, chapter 2, "Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth is Subjectivity." Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 1992, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 997- 1007).

[33] L. E. Miller and J. Jensen, *Questions that Matter. An Invitation to Philosophy*. Sixth edition, New York, University of Colorado: McGraw-Hill, 2009, pp. 113- 123, 359 – 368). Miller clearly shows how Berkeley's subjective idealism/solipsism eliminates the mind-body problem through "Esse est Percipi"/ "To be is to be perceived" (Miller and Jensen 2009, pp. 113- 123). By citing Sartre's dictum of "existence precedes essence" and "subjectivity must be the starting point" (Miller and Jensen 2009, p. 359) Miller, also, shows how existentialism becomes the giant opponent of absolutism (Miller and Jensen 2009, p. 368).

[34] Miller and Jensen 2009, pp. 113 - 123.

[35] Miller and Jensen 2009, p.359.

[36] Miller and Jensen 2009, p. 368.

[37] For more details on Kierkegaard's critique of Hegelian idealism see Judith Butler's "Kierkegaard's Speculative Despair," quoted in Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (eds.), *The Age of German Idealism. Routledge History of Philosophy*. Volume VI, 1993, (London and New York, Routledge: Taylor and Francis, 1993, Chapter 11, pp. 363 - 391).

[38] J.P. Sartre 1995 (cited in Spade 1996, p. 197).

[39] Sartre 1995, (cf. Spade 1996, p. 144).

[40] Sartre 1995 (cited in Spade 1996, p. 46), and Husserl 2006, p. 84. Particularly, Edmund Husserl was the founder of phenomenology, and explained how consciousness becomes the character of 'intensionality'. For more details (see E. Husserl (2006), *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart, edited by Rudolf Bernet, Volume XII, "From the Lectures of Winter Semester" (1910- 1911), Netherland: Springer, 2006. Within this Husserl elaborated the nature of 'I', the "other I," and the failure of dualism/Cartesian "Ship-wreck" on explaining how to solve the union or relationship between mind and matter if realities are really two distinct things. To solve such "mind-body problem" Husserl started with the assumption in what he called "Bracketing [Existence]" to know reality as it is.

such "mind-body problem" Husserl started with the assumption in what he called "Bracketing [Existence]" to know reality as it is.[41]

However, the ways in which those plural 'I' (Husserl's "the other I") can be known involves further investigations and explanations on the nature of language. Because, though the certainty/full knowledge of empirical realities are not accessible to sensation and reason, peoples attempted to understand it by using language as the middle ground between 'themselves' [plural I's] and those realities (see Wittgenstein's *Tractiterian* "picture theory of reality" or Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, 4.01, and *Philosophical Investigation,* section I/27, Hustedde's "Symbolic Interactionalism"[42] [15, 16, 17].[43]

This is the birth-place in which new knowledge is created, and paves the chance for constructivist approach/social constructivism to win the debate on the epistemological justification on the birth of knowledge [18].[44] Gabor Kutrovaz shows how Karin Knorr-Cetina's social epistemology/social constructivist epistemology deals on building "machineries that produce knowledge" rather than production of knowledge by footnoting Knorr-Cetina's position. Under this Gabor Kutrovaz said:

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[41] See Husserl's position on the cited place (Ibid).

[42] Hustedde's "symbolic interactionalism" is cited from Philips and Pitman 2009, pp. 26 – 27.

[43] a) L. Wittgenstein (1961), *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.Within this Wittgenstein deeply shows how words in language correspond to the atomic/subatomic realities of the external world (see *Tractatus*, 4.01). Later on while he attempted to find the words such as: "Away! Ow! Help! Fine! No!" etc., then he concluded that there are some/certain words which can not correspond to the realities over there (Wittgenstein 1958, p.10, in *Philosophical Investigation I/27).* Instead of defending picture theory of reality in language Wittgenstein called "language game" as the essence of language. It is due to this in which Wittgenstein was considered as the first philosopher who criticized his own work, and thus, the brilliant analytic philosopher. For more details see *philosophical Investigation I/2.*

b) L. Wittgenstein (1953), *Philosophical Investigations.* Translated by G.E.M Anscombe, First published in 1953, and second edition in 1958, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.

c) R.J. Hustedde (no date), "Seven Theories for Seven Community Developers." Cited from R. Philips, and R.H. Pitman (eds.), *An Introduction to Community Development.* London and New York, Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2009. Within this article Hustedde deeply shows how peoples give meaning to the things and events through symbols in the language and this becomes a sort of "drama" - "drama in which the "audience" and "team players" interact" (cf. Philips and Pitman 2009, p. 26)).

[44] Cited from G. Kutrovaz 2005, pp. 23- 25.

"…the constructivist programme by being "not interested in the construction of knowledge but in the construction of the ***machineries*** of knowledge construction" (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 3), and thus she leaves behind the neighbourhood of traditional epistemology for a genuine sociological enterprise." [45]

When the epistemological justification of space-time occupied objects are claimed to be accepted/approved through realism; but the nature of space and time in themselves (including ideas in the mind) are only defended through their "givenness" or how they appear to us [19, 20]. [46] These are the two premises on which the correspondence theory of truth is rejected in addition to the existence of some words which lack objects out there while we see Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations I/27* (for example: words such as "wow! Wonderful! Nice!"). This is further defended through the occurrence of the relations between objects in the space and time [in their real existence] without my will/existence metaphysically on the one hand. And on the other hand, the process of knowing those objects (realizing those physical realities) involves 'me' or 'self' ('I') without contradiction. Therefore, phenomenological-realism is the correct epistemological sphere in which realization will be assessed philosophically.

3.2. The Deduction of an Absolute I
Having seen how the real objects of the world become realized to realizer of an 'I' in the process of realization (realizing), then it is possible to call that those realizers and realized are connected together by the means of coherence.

However, I doubt whether or not 'I' in turn a realized (object) to the 'other I' when I see the many 'selves'/peoples around me through Einstenian "point of reference". Individually (from the subjective point of reference) any of those peoples (plural I's) become a realized object to each other's (among themselves). Therefore, it is necessary to follow that there is certainly an 'Absolute I' or 'Giant I' in which all other 'selves'/plural I's rest on. Such 'Absolute I' become acts as the Realizer of all other realizers, and thus,

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[45] The purpose is not to produce the "world" ("Knowledge") but "to construct machineries that produce knowledge" (cited in Kutrovaz 2005, p.25) since "the knowledge is not truly reflection of reality but rather how we construct it" (Ibid).

[46] a) I. Kant (1781), *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn (its Preface to the first edition in 1781, and second edition and introduction in April, 1787), Konigsberg: Manybooks.net.

b) R. Chisholm, "The Myth of the Given." Cited in E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl, and M. MacGrath (eds.), *Epistemology*: *An Anthology*. Second edition, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, pp. 90-91).
R. Chisholm's "The Myth of the Given" originally published in R. Chisholm, *Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 261 – 86 as we from the footnote of *An Anthology* (Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and MacGrath 2008, p.80).

realization becomes the holistic subject which involves both epistemic and metaphysical spheres in philosophy.

As the enquiry of an 'Absolute' real subject is devoid of [outside] empirical evidence, then it is completely pure thought that involves careful investigation of its method. Accordingly, it involves the method of deduction as shown below.
- Premise 1: All of those things that surrounded [me] become realized to me [I].
- Premise 2: There are also peoples like me in which the world (including me/I) become realized to them.
- Conclusion: Therefore, there are many 'selves' (plural I's) which become realized (objects) to themselves.

From this argument we can draw the following possibilities in realization. It looks like this:
- Premise 1: Within realization there are realizer (the subject), realized (the object), and its process (realizing).
- Premise 2: Every realized object is connected to realizer (the subject I) by the means of coherence.
- Premise 3: There are also many 'selves' (plural I's/ 'other I') in which those 'selves' (plural I/ 'other I') become an object (realized) to (among) themselves.
- Conclusion: Therefore, there is an 'Absolute I' in which all other selves (plural I's) become the realized objects to it.

Such existence of an 'Absolute I' or 'Giant I' is also called the metaphysics of God. Though proving the existence of God through induction is impossible (problematic), the existence of an 'Absolute' necessary 'I' tells us that there is necessary substance in which all other 'selves' or 'plural I' become an object to it.

Such an 'Absolute' is certain to itself but uncertain to me since I am not the subject that put an 'Absolute' into an object. Without committing reductionism the re-wiring of consciousnesses into one another and their linkage to the one 'Absolute I' reverses the claim that subjective idealists and existentialists put a person the subject into an object. This is the radical change in the history of contemporary philosophy since the revival of speculative philosophy will be inevitable.

IV. CONCLUSION

4.1. The Philosophical Implication and the First Drawn Conclusion of Understanding Realization through Holistic-dualism

It is possible to raise, therefore, the question that what we infer the implication and insight from the enquiry of the subject 'realization'?

We can possible to generalize/infer that realization is the most useful philosophical and scientific discourse. Because, it centered itself between epistemology and metaphysics from philosophical perspective on the one hand, whereas it involves how knowledge is constructed from empirical world scientifically on the other hand. Therefore, an enquiry of realization will leads us to accept

the real existence of the world, the real existence of mind (I and its ideas), the occurrence of many minds/"other I's" (beside the problem of the other mind) and the certain existence of an Absolute necessary Truth/God.

'Realization' as the 'subject'/'whole' becomes an 'Absolute I' holistically, whereas it becomes an individual human being (I/myself) and the world/body while it is seen dualistically. It follows that while realization serves as "the servant of the two masters" between mental philosophy and psychology, then it implies that its enquiry is open for any scientific investigation on its intersecting point. For example, one of the most common properties of set (mathematical set) is its relation with the other set rather than on itself. One set is not a proper set to itself rather is the subset to the other set. This analogy is similar with the process of realization since it is an aspect of philosophy of nature.

Accordingly, while engaging on the enquiry of realization within philosophical sphere, there are many insights in which we are forced to dig out. In this case an investigator forced to look himself within the biggest sea/ocean like a person who swims it. However, an investigator has not a compass that shows him the direction on which he wants to move. This means that an investigator does not have any moral ground to runs himself towards on his will. Rather he is guided by the variables/data, and his duty is simply to follow those variables and reporting an explanation on what he had encountered within his investigation [21].[47]

The way an investigator arrived on explanation is surprising one. This means that in the process of realization [realizing realization] an investigator starts with the assumption that there is the world out there (the 'body' within mental philosophy) beside his existence. Such situation is also called the 'presupposition' in scientific activity [22].[48] Whenever presupposition is prevalent there is metaphysics of the body (pats) and paves the chance for further/another thought experiment or speculation of 'pure thought'/mind.

Secondly, there is an assumption that those realized objects out there are known to the subject/realizer through analyzing the connotations of realization [realizer, realized, and realizing]. At this stage the important issue which appears to the intellect is 'the forces'/ 'laws' that acts and guides those objects out there and their relations to the subject (I). The possible answers might be from chemistry and physics are "chemical bonding" and "natural laws" with

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[47] Such type of survey is also called **"ex post facto"** type of research investigation in social science (Kothari 2004, p. 2). For more detail see C.R. Kothari, *Research Methodology. Methods and Techniques*. Second edition, (New Delhi: New Age Publishers, 2004, pp. 2 – 3).

[48] For more (see Beaver and Guerts 1996, p.1). D. Beaver and B. Guerts, "Presupposition." Uploaded on *ResearchGate* by Bart Guerts on (20 May 2014).

their respective manners [23].[49] This is an epistemological sphere which focuses on the subject-object relations (between mind and the forces that act upon matter with its motion). Thus, metaphysics of order and change is the key point of investigation.

4.2. Curiosity of the Position

At the end, the subject (mind) becomes the center whereas the pats ('monads') are known and/or related to the mind through their properties. Those pats ('the many') are connected the one I by the means of coherence (wires of consciousness) like the installed programs (software) of computer on same (single) hardware. However, the problem behind this is that uncovering the relation between subject-subject (I with another I). Consequently, the subject becomes reduced to an object through relativity theory, and thus, the search for the one subject (whole) will be inevitable.

Therefore, there is an absolute certain whole I that serves as the subject for the smaller many I's. This is known as the problem of substance, and shows us the existence of God. Such substance is named as an 'Absolute' or 'Giant I' and necessarily certain existence to itself. But I am not certain to know its full character since I am already turned into an object realized to it. As a result, genuine knowledge is found between skepticism and existence through 'pure thought' rather than sense experiences.

Consequently, epistemology of metaphysics is the scope in which realization is assessed philosophically. This sphere is derived from the subject (intellect) in which phenomenology investigates the given phenomena in the mind. On the other side, realism concerns on what is over there (existence). Therefore, holistic-dualism is the intersecting point that occurs while engaging on the discourses of realization through dual and multiple investigations.

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[49] I mean that an enquiry of realization in terms of **object-object/body-body** relation is the business of natural science. However, since the methods in which natural scientists rely on (which is induction) is uncertain, then it is subject to what is called "the problem of problems" (Simpson 1949, pp. 123 - 129, in Part II/X). This arises from the probable (approximation) in induction, and therefore, object-object study and induction are outside the realm of realization in this context.

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